

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 09318 172022Z

62

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

----- 055282

O 171845Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9936

S E C R E T MOSCOW 9318

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, UR, US, OEXD

SUBJ: NUCLEAR TEST BAN TECHNICAL TALKS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. SOVIETS DID NOT PRESENT TECHNICAL DATA ON GEOLOGY OR YIELD CALIBRATION. MOROKHOV BEGAN BY QUOTING STATEMENT OF BREZHNEV ON 14 JUNE WHICH HE TERMED OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. IN DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS PRACTICE SOVIETS OMITTED WORD "WEAPONS" IN MOST REFERENCES TO UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS. MOROKHOV STATED IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT SIMULTANEOUS EXPLOSIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A SINGLE EXPLOSIVE TEST FOR NUMERICAL QUOTA AND THRESHOLD PURPOSES. GALITCH COUNTERED ROMNEY'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 13 ON EFFECT OF DEPTH OF BURIAL ON YIELD DETERMINATION. STOESSEL RECAPITULATED US STATEMENT OF JUNE 13 ON ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF YIELD THRESHOLD CONCEPT. HE DISCUSSED PNE PROBLEM. SYKES ANSWERED SOME EARLIER SOVIET SEISMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. MCNALLY DISCUSSED PROBLEMS OF NUMERICAL QUOTA AND LOWER THRESHOLD. MOROKHOV IN COMMENTING ON STOESSEL'S PNE STATEMENT SAID THAT REFLECTION ON THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE REQUIRED AND HE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE CLOSE TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT. END SUMMARY.

2. STOESSEL INTRODUCED DAVIES, MAY, RACHLIN, ROWNY, AND WALSH. MOROKHOV WELCOMED THE NEW ARRIVALS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION THAT PERMEATED THE TALKS SO FAR WOULD BE PRESERVED. HE QUOTED BREZHNEV'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 09318 172022Z

14 JUNE SPEECH (MISQUOTED BY AP) THAT /SOVIET SIDE WAS

READY EVEN NOW TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE US ON LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RIGHT UP TO COMPLETE CESSATION OF TESTING WITHIN A AGREED TIME SCHEDULE," SAYING THAT THE STATEMENT WAS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. THE SOLUTION OF THE TASK STATED BY BREZHNEV WAS THE OBJECT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF YIELD, WITH A QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION BETWEEN THE THRESHOLDS, IN ADDITION TO THE PROPOSAL THAT SUCH TESTS BE CONDUCTED ONLY AT TEST SITES WHOSE LOCATIONS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED. HE NOTED CONSTRUCTIVE TRENDS IN TALKS. STOESSEL HAD STATED THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO A YIELD THRESHOLD WITH TESTS CONDUCTED ONLY AT ANNOUNCED SITES. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL EFFORTS, E.G., THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE US SIDE ON QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS WITH A LOWER THRESHOLD. MOROKHOV SAID MEANINGFULNESS OF A AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY ENHANCED BY ACCEPTANCE OF THESE LIMITATIONS AND EMPHASIZED GREAT IMPORTANCE OF A MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON THEM. MOROKHOV WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT WITH RESPECT TO SIMULTANEOUS EXPLOSIONS THE TWO SIDES WOULD BE IN A POSITION OF COMPLETE EQUALITY. SIMULTANEOUS MULTIPLE EXPLOSIONS WOULD FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE UNDERSTANDING BE CONSIDERED AS A SINGLE EXPLOSION WITHIN THE QUALITATIVE QUOTA AND WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE YIELD THRESHOLDS ESTABLISHED.

3. GALITCH MADE A STATEMENT ABOUT ROMNEY'S PRESENTATION OF JUNE 13. HE STATED THAT IN PRACTICE VARIATIONS IN DEPTH DO NOT AFFECT MAGNITUDE AS MUCH AS THE THEORETICAL FACTOR OF TWO MIGHT SUGGEST. HE PRESENTED TWO EXAMPLES FROM THE PUBLISHED WORK OF A. DOUGLAS ON THE USE OF "SPIKE" FILTERS FOR SEPARATING THE SEISMIC PHASE PP AND FOR DETERMINING DEPTH. HE STATED THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ARE SUFFICIENT TO CORRECT MAGNITUDES FOR THE EFFECT OF SOURCE DEPTH.

4. STOESSEL RECAPITULATED US POSITION NOTING THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE THE CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR TEST BAN AGREEMENT BASED ON A YIELD THRESHOLD. HE STATED THAT THE YIELD THRESHOLD MUST APPLY TO AOO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 09318 172022Z

UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, WITH NO EXCEPTIONS FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WHICH ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER MIGHT ASSERT WERE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

5. STOESSEL STATED THE US POSITION THAT ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. IN THE CASE AT HAND, OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE YIELD THRESHOLD IS CONTINGENT UPON AN EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION NEEDED TO PER-

MIT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. THE US ALSO BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL THAT TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE RESTRICTED TO SPECIFIC TEST SITES FOR WHICH AGREED DATA REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN SATISFIED. PNES OUTSIDE THE TEST SITES COULD BE ALLOWED ONLY IF INFORMATION WERE PROVIDED FOR PROPER VERIFICATION.

6. IN US VIEW NEXT TASK IS TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC TEST STIES AND TO TABLE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON YIELDS, EXPOL-
SIONDEPTHS, AND ROCK CHARACTERISTICS NECESSARY FOR PROPER VERIFICATION.

7. SYKES REPLIED TO SOME SOVIET QUESTIONS OF JUNE 11. HE POINTED OUT THAT WHILE DETERMINATION WITH A WELL DIS-
TRIBUTED NETWORK COULD BE MADE THAT EXPOLOSIONS HAD OCCURRED WITHIN A TEST SITE, THE ACCURACY WAS USUALLY NOT SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE WHERE ON THE SITE AND IN WHAT MEDIUM THE EXPLOSION HAD OCCURRED. HE RESPONDED WITH SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIOS FOR LONGSHOT AS REQUESTED BY SAFRONOV. HE RESPONDED TO OSIN'S QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER HIS CONCERN IN LOCATING EVENTS WAS ABOUT LACK OF KNOW-
LEDGE OF SYSTEMATIC ERROR OR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ROCK TYPE BY NOTING THAT HIS PRIMARY CONCERN WAS IN OBTAINING ENOUGH INFORMATION ON ROCK PROPERTIES THAT YIELD MAY BE DETERMINED RELIABLY.

8. MCNALLY DELIVERED STATEMENT ON QUOTA. SINCE THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF TESTS CARRIED OUT COULD EXCEED THE NUM-
BER STATED IN THE QUOTA, THE QUOTA WOULD NOT IMPOSE A SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR TESTS. A LOWER THRESHOLD WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS BEYOND THOSE PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY US SEISMOLOGISTS SINCE SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIOS WOULD BE REDUCED AND THE NUMBER OF STATIONS DETECTING THE SIGNALS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 09318 172022Z

WOULD BE SMALL. THESE FACTORS WOULD LEAD TO INCREASED UNCERTAINTY IN THE MAGNITUDE AND HENCE IN THE YIELD DETER-
MINATION. IN ADDITION LOCATION UNCERTAINTIES WOULD BE INCREASED.

9. MOROKHOV SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF VIEWS TO EXPRESS AFTER CONSIDERING US STATEMENTS OF TODAY. HE NOTED, IN PARTICULAR, STOESSEL'S STATEMENT ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND WEAPONS TEST EXPLOSIONS AT TEST SITES. HE BELIEVED THAT THE SIDES ARE CLOSE TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT, BUT THOUGHT THAT FUR-
THER EXAMINATION OF THE US PROPOSAL WAS NEEDED.

10. NEXT MEETING SET FOR 10:30 A.M. JUNE 19.
STOESSEL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, NUCLEAR TEST, TEXT ON MICROFILM ONLY, DATA, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: WorrelSW
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MOSCOW09318
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P880125-1118, D740157-0782
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740639/aaaabhnd.tel
Line Count: 169
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: WorrelSW
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 16 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 APR 2002 by garlanwa>; APPROVED <11 MAR 2003 by WorrelSW>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NUCLEAR TEST BAN TECHNICAL TALKS
TAGS: PARM, OEXC, UR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005